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The SMU, at least before 1901, was similar to 
the LMU in being largely a common 
standardization of weights and measures; 
after 1901 it came closer to being a monetary 
union, although the currencies of Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway still existed in distinct 
forms and there was no common interest 
rate.1  
The article discusses the most recent 
problems for the Eurozone, namely the 
Greek crisis and the conduct of the 
European Central Bank, which could lead to 
considerable difficulties for a stable 
Eurozone. I will examine some lessons from 
the three historical monetary unions relevant 
to the current Eurozone crisis. Although 
there is a vast historical gulf separating these 
late-nineteenth-century monetary unions 
from the present, they provide ‘food for 
thought’ for policymakers and commentators 
attempting to think through the 
complications facing the Eurozone.2 
 
Historical Lessons for the European 
Monetary Union 
Luca Einaudi has warned that comparisons 
between earlier monetary unions and the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) are 
‘misleading to some extent’, since ‘technical 
aspects of money and political background 
have changed radically’3. Unlike in the 
nineteenth century, we are now in a world of 
fiat currencies, of tighter European political 
A Monetary Union is one where there is a 
single fiat currency with a single monetary 
authority (a central bank). It also has a 
single interest and exchange rate, and a 
single legal entity responsible for issuing 
that currency across a geographic area. This 
combination of features required for a true 
monetary union suggests that many 
previous monetary unions, including the 
Latin Monetary Union (LMU) and the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU) were 
not proper monetary unions as such, while 
the Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union 
(AHMU) was and the Eurozone is. 
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and institutional integration, and of a vastly 
different system of national central banks. 
Despite this, a few lessons can be gleaned for 
the contemporary EMU from the memory of 
the LMU, the SMU and the AHMU. The 
most important, overarching lessons that can 
be taken from the nineteenth-century 
European monetary unions’ discussion in this 
article are: 
 
(1) The fragility of monetary unions. One 
lesson from the historical record on 
monetary unions is recognition of the 
fragility of such arrangements, especially in 
the absence of other levers for fostering 
economic convergence and formal 
coordination of member states’ economies. 
The LMU, the SMU and the AHMU all 
disappeared for reasons often connected with 
a lack of coordination or too difficult 
financial circumstances – and in particular 
with the First World War. 
 
(2) The importance of economic 
convergence for a viable monetary union. 
Another lesson from the historical record is 
the issue of economic convergence and 
whether an Optimal Currency Area (OCA) is 
an essential condition. The SMU provides, 
perhaps, the most potent example of this 
factor, considering the Scandinavian nations’ 
lack of economic convergence throughout 
their experience of monetary union. This 
helped to put pressures on the SMU, which 
eventually aided in its dissolution. Ceteris 
paribus economic convergence is an 
important element in a well-functioning 
monetary union. On the other hand, the 
United States is an example of an OCA that 
was weak but which, despite the Civil War 
and the currency collapse in the 1920s, has 
become a robust single currency. What is 
perhaps remarkable about the euro is that, 
despite the great divergence across the EU’s 
economies, it was first of all established and, 
second, has actually survived the most 
serious threat to its existence with the 2008 
financial crisis. This suggests that certain key 
conditions have changed, particularly those 
dealt with under (3) below. 
 
(3) The importance of institutional 
safeguards to curb moral hazard and to 
ensure deeper coordination. Another 
difficulty in monetary unions, highlighted by 
the examples of the LMU and the SMU, in 
particular, is that of moral hazard. It is 
important that monetary unions create 
institutional safeguards to prevent moral 
hazard and free-riding problems. 
Furthermore, the continuing existence of 
national interests in previous unions meant 
that it was difficult to coordinate fiscal and 
economic policies across the member states.  
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(4) The relevance of ‘national’ interests. 
An important lesson, however, may be drawn 
in the comparison between the nineteenth 
century and the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries: this is the changing 
role of the nation state and of national 
governments. The early period was actually 
the heyday of nation-state nationalism, but 
this had considerably diminished by the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. The drive 
towards EMU was possible only because the 
EU’s member states were willing to surrender 
certain aspects of sovereignty to the 
supranational institutions. The EMU became, 
therefore, a much more deeply integrated 
union than was possible, at least across 
different countries in the earlier period. In 
fact, it was only possible in a federation such 
as the United States or Canada because there 
was a willingness to create a new overarching 
entity. Although the EU is not yet a 
federation, it is developing into something 
quite similar. This has been borne out by the 
progress made in devising institutional 
responses to the crisis and the willingness to 
use it as a means of deepening integration 
even further.  
(5) Finally, there is the challenge of 
creating representative and strong 
centralised institutions in a monetary 
union. Such institutions ought to be both (a) 
representative and (b) able to battle issues of 
moral hazard. The experience of the AHMU, 
in which Hungary was able to extort highly 
favourable terms through threat of exit, 
points to the importance of political 
institutions in the creation of any tenable 
monetary union. The current arrangement of 
the ECB, in fact, seems poorly suited to this 
task at hand, in part because of precisely the 
sort of misalignment of power seen in the 
AHMU. 
 
Greece: Eurozone sovereign debt 
restructuring necessary, but Troika clung 
to austerity 
The Eurozone has followed a self-destructive 
strategy for too long. The single currency 
zone was driven towards an unnecessary 
crisis and Greece into meltdown before 
serious consideration of the alternatives. 
Forcing Greece to exit would be damaging 
for Greece in the short to medium term, but 
it could be far more painful for the 
Eurozone.  
Any scenario for how to tackle the Greek 
debt crisis will have to be considered based 
on the fact that there is no chance 
whatsoever of Greece repaying its debts. 
Only the creditor nations of Europe’s 
economically stronger northern region refuse 
to acknowledge this reality. The current set-
up is completely unsustainable. There is no 
reason why Europe cannot recognise this and 
make the necessary adjustments. In spite of 
historical experience that indicates fiscal 
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consolidation during recessionary periods is 
harmful, Europe, under German leadership, 
opted for austerity policies in the aftermath 
of the global crisis of 2008, thereby making a 
bad situation even worse.  
Greece will not be able to recover from its 
current crisis without a significant haircut for 
the official sector debt holders. The country’s 
public debt-to-GDP ratio has increased 
substantially under the so-called ‘bailout’ 
programme. Growth in the Eurozone has 
stagnated and future prospects for 
sustainable growth are highly unlikely without 
a major shift in the economic policies of the 
present, including the emphasis on austerity 
and balanced budgets. The debate over the 
treatment of Greek debt is still a major issue 
for the Eurozone.4  
Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff 5 have argued 
that the Troika of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) should have entertained debt 
reduction during the first five months of 
2010. The IMF6 ex post evaluation of 
exceptional access under the 2010 Greek 
stand-by arrangement reaches a somewhat 
ambiguous conclusion: ‘Upfront debt 
restructuring was not feasible at the outset. 
While the IMF began to push for Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI) once the 
programme went off track in early 2011, it 
took time for the stakeholders to agree on a 
common and coherent strategy.’ Barry 
Eichengreen,7 a long-time advocate of debt 
reduction in sovereign financial crises is 
unambiguous: ‘The country’s sovereign debt 
should have been restructured without delay,’ 
writing down its debt burden by two-thirds.  
Generally, as argued by the IMF, debt 
reduction is too little and too late. Without a 
dramatic change in the collective approach to 
public sector involvement, which was not on 
the cards in May 2010, early debt reductions 
would almost always be too small and would 
need to be repeated, which was a good 
reason to wait. Without an outright Greek 
default or suspension of payments, which in 
May 2010 would have been economically and 
financially complicated for Greece and for 
the viability of the Eurozone, Greece could 
not have achieved the two-thirds reduction in 
face value of its debt that Eichengreen argues 
was appropriate.8 
The IMF, in a 50-page report, produced a 
concise analysis of what went wrong in the 
Greek rescue programme. The IMF 
expressed regret that it took an excessively 
long time to agree a debt restructuring for 
Greece.9 The IMF deserves credit for being 
publically self-critical about its handling of 
the Eurozone crisis. How long will we have 
to wait for a similar self-analysis of the ECB’s 
role in this affair?10  
It is now clear that the IMF management and 
staff were right not to include debt reduction 
as part of the May 2010 Greek programme, 
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but it was a mistake to wait until March 2012 
to implement debt reduction for the country, 
because the delay at that point weakened the 
commitment of the Greek authorities to 
implement their reform programme. The 
delay in implementing a debt restructuring 
had a serious cost for European taxpayers 
and was very damaging to the Greek 
economy. It cost European taxpayers money 
because private Greek creditors were repaid 
in full for two years, with the money coming 
from European taxpayers and the IMF.11 
After Greece accepted the Troika bailout, 
members of the ECB Executive Board 
regularly gave speeches depicting a potential 
Greek default as provoking ‘an economic 
meltdown’ across the Eurozone.12 
Neither then-IMF boss Dominique Strauss-
Kahn – who was a potential socialist 
candidate for the French presidency at the 
time – nor German chancellor Angela 
Merkel, nor finance minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble, would countenance that at the 
time, arguing instead they had to rescue the 
German, French and European banking 
system. What they wanted to avoid, of 
course, was any losses for their respective 
banks. 
One thing Greece’s creditors can do to help 
resolve the crisis as speedily as possible is to 
offer significant debt relief. With the IMF’s 
Debt Sustainability Analysis published on 26 
June 2015, the economic case for providing 
such relief is beyond doubt. Finally, after a 
prolonged standoff with the Greek 
government through the first half of 2015, 
the IMF publicly stated that Greece’s official 
debt was unsustainable and a large chunk 
needed to be written off. But the Fund still 
refused to back off on austerity. Even 
Blanchard supported the IMF’s insistence on 
further fiscal consolidation.13 
The alternative approach – pushing Greece 
towards a euro exit – is probably the strategy 
that will ultimately minimise the return of 
money to its creditors. The moral and 
economic case for debt relief is there.14 Now 
it just requires the political courage of 
Europe’s leaders to admit their past 
mistakes and stop pretending Greece is 
going to pay back all the money.15 
The European Central Bank rules the 
democratic void  
On 4 February 2015, the ECB unexpectedly 
and suddenly cancelled acceptance of Greek 
bonds as collateral for liquidity funding 
unless Greece obeyed the Troika agreement. 
The ECB’s irresponsible and incompetent 
actions call into question their respect for the 
Greek government’s attempts to resolve its 
debt crisis in a sustainable way. The ECB 
may or may not have good reasons to cut off 
Greece – depending on your point of view – 
but it is clear that such a move would be 
political. A central bank that is supposed to 
be the lender of last resort and guardian of 
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financial stability would be taking a deliberate 
and calculated decision to destroy the Greek 
banking system. The ECB is now seen in 
some quarters as arrogant, unaccountable and 
authoritarian. 
The ECB has an unfortunate tendency to act 
with delay and without creativity. Not only 
was the ECB slow to cut interest rates, it 
acted first against the tide and raised them 
twice in 2011. It then took more than half a 
decade longer than the US Federal Reserve 
or the Bank of England to get round to 
quantitative easing, which means the central 
bank buying assets, usually government 
bonds, with money it has printed or created 
electronically and pumping this extra money 
directly into the financial system. Most 
damagingly of all, European policymakers 
insisted on austerity programmes that 
resulted in still weaker growth and even 
higher levels of unemployment. Yet any form 
of accountability is strongly missing. 
The euro, although ‘a currency without a 
state’, is backed by significant political and 
even state-like commitments. That the euro 
must be saved at all costs is an imperative 
suggested not only by Mario Draghi, the 
technocrat, but Angela Merkel, the 
statesman. Political elites, particularly in 
Germany, have staked their legacy on its 
success.  
But there is a growing mismatch between the 
monetary and fiscal sides of the Eurozone 
governance system and this has led to a 
number of problems. The main problem is 
that, while we may not find it easy to live 
with the ECB, we cannot live without it. Yet, 
when we look at the Greek bailout 
programmes, it is easy to conclude that they 
have failed. The Troika has imposed 
austerity, which has led to a severe 
contraction of output and highly adverse 
welfare effects. This was intended, in a way, 
to punish Greece for its profligacy rather 
than serve as a way out of the crisis.  
The ECB is far more independent than the 
US central bank, the Federal Reserve, whose 
legal status is far weaker and which is directly 
accountable to Congress and the 
government. The ECB was supposed to be 
like the German central bank, the 
Bundesbank. The ECB, however, has failed 
to emulate the distinctive attributes that made 
the Bundesbank successful, such as 
accountability and interdependence with 
other democratic institutions. The Maastricht 
Treaty, which defines the role of the ECB, 
says that the ECB has a primary mandate to 
maintain stable prices. It also says that, 
‘where it is possible without compromising 
the mandate to maintain price stability’, the 
ECB will also support the ‘general economic 
policy of the EU’, which includes, among 
others, ‘steady, non-inflationary and 
environmentally friendly growth’ and ‘a high 
level of employment’. However, the emphasis 
is explicitly on price stability. The ECB can 
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justly claim to have held together a poorly 
designed system in difficult circumstances. 
But the mission creep is its own 
responsibility.  
The ECB, in fact, is the least accountable 
central bank among advanced nations.16 
There is no democratic accountability when 
the ECB strong-arms governments into 
policy actions that go well beyond any 
reasonable interpretation of its mandate.  
Not only is the ECB shielded from 
politicians, ECB statutes have also placed it 
beyond the reach of democratic rules on bad 
behaviour. The ultimate control politicians 
have over a central bank is the power to 
change its statutes and the power to appoint 
governors. For example, in the case of 
Germany, a simple majority in the Bundestag 
can change Bundesbank law. This procedure 
is absent in the Eurozone. The statutes of the 
ECB can only be changed by revising the 
Maastricht Treaty, which requires unanimity 
of all member states. The ECB today argues 
that the only institution that has the right to 
limit its power is the European Court of 
Justice, which has an activist Europhile 
interpretation of European treaties. The crisis 
has given the ECB governing council such an 
increased power that no national government 
or national institution can match it.  
The project of European integration was not 
designed democratically, or at least not in the 
way democracy is traditionally conceived in 
terms of placing ultimate law-making 
authority in the hands of the people or their 
elected representatives. It is not even meant 
to be democratically responsive in the way 
that term is usually understood. Any 
democratic deficit that the EU suffers seems 
to many observers a deliberately constructed 
one. So how could we control the ECB in the 
future? It needs to be placed under a stricter 
and more direct supervision by democratically 
elected politicians. One of the institutions the 
president of the ECB puts himself in front 
of, the European Parliament, does not inspire 
anyone to believe that the ECB is being held 
accountable. This very independence means 
that democratic governments now have no 
way to keep the ECB accountable if it starts 
to violate its mandate. 
A revised treaty, Maastricht mark two, would 
need to look at a proper oversight of ECB 
activities. One possibility is a supervisory 
committee composed of members of national 
parliaments and European Parliament who 
should also have the ability to dismiss 
particular members of the ECB Governing 
Council before the end of their terms. This 
should be the case if the majority of the 
supervising board considers the respective 
member of the Governing Council to have 
failed at its job. Unlike today, the council 
members would be accountable to 
democratically elected politicians. It may be 
important for other Eurozone countries to 
emulate the German constitutional court 
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The Five Presidents report summarizes the 
debate on the Deep and Genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU).17 The debate 
was launched by publication of the European 
Commission’s Communication on ‘A 
Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU’ in 
November 2012. 18   
In comparison with the 2012 
Communication, the Five Presidents report is 
less ambitious but, at the same time, less 
ambitious because it does not contain 
proposal of debt mutualisation presented in 
the 2012 Blueprint. It would further 
undermine fiscal discipline on national level, 
already compromised by several bail-outs of 
the troubled countries and continuous 
breaching of fiscal criteria established by the 
Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) and the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). 
All measures, which are to be adopted in the 
Stage 1 (between July 1, 2015 and June 30, 
2017) as ‘Immediate Steps’, do not require 
changes in the EU Treaties. They can be 
implemented through either EU secondary 
legislation or the Commission’s own 
decisions. This cannot be said about the 
Stage 2 (‘Completing the EMU Architecture’) 
that will require changes in the Treaties 
although the time horizon proposed (until 
2025) makes this potentially feasible (if 
accepted by all EU member states).  
The Five President’s Report anticipates the 
Eurozone having a treasury, with tax and 
debt-raising powers and powers to 
spend.  Such a treasury function would 
clearly require political oversight.  And 
indeed there is now an ongoing discussion 
about the establishment of democratic 
accountability mechanisms within the 
eurozone.   
The Eurozone, in its relatively short time of 
existence, has successfully overcome a 
number of crisis periods. As the political 
landscape is changing, it will be difficult to 
develop more constructive and proactive 
solutions for the Eurozone crisis, such as 
debt restructuring, than was the case with the 
‘muddling-through’ approach that has 
characterised the Eurozone crisis strategy in 
the last few years, especially in Greece. The 
ECB epitomizes that perceived ‘democratic 
deficit’ run by an unaccountable bureaucracy 
that poses serious problems for the future of 
the Eurozone. 
EMU has been a considerable achievement. 
Yet it also remains fragile because of a flaw in 
its governance. This flaw is linked to the non-
existence of a European government with the 
power to spend and to tax, which would be 
independent from national governments, 
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which entails the absence of a minimal degree 
of budgetary integration and of political 
unification. The five historical lessons for the 
EMU outlined above have not been 
addressed by Eurozone policymakers.  
If mutualisation of at least a part of member 
states’ debt issuance were to happen, the 
Eurozone would be taking a big stride 
towards a large, liquid, integrated bond 
market like that of the United States, which 
makes the dollar such an attractive key 
currency. As such, it would partly address the 
complaint that the euro is a currency without 
a state and so by definition lacks the 
independent fiscal capacity that is a 
fundamental characteristic of a reserve 
currency. 19 
The Eurozone and the EU will have critical 
decisions to make when dealing with the 
possible Greek exit from the euro, the 
possibility that the United Kingdom will vote 
to leave the EU on 23 June 2016 and the 
ongoing migrant crisis. While those 
challenges play out, the survival of the EMU 
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